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Lecture Outline 
• How further nuclear arms reductions and 
arms control can enhance US security 
• Arms control opportunities 
• Arms control challenges 
Reduced Enough Already? 
New START Treaty 
• Each side limited to no more than 
• 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles 
• 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers 
and heavy bombers 
• 1550 deployed strategic warheads 
• Limits to be implemented by 2018 
 
• US-Russian strategic balance stable and 
numbers declining … need to do more? 
WHY PURSUE FURTHER 
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL? 
     
Reduce Strategic Threat to US 
• Under New START, 
Russia can still have 
~2000 deployed 
strategic warheads 
• Most 7-55 times the 
power of “Little Boy” 
and “Fat Man” 
Limit Nonstrategic 
(Tactical) Weapons 
• Not constrained by 
any treaty 
• Concern to US allies 
• Russian numerical 
advantage 
• Strategic vs non-
strategic 
 
Transparency 
• Data exchange and 
updates 
• Notifications 
• On-site inspections 
• Result:  US knows 
more about Russian 
strategic forces 
 
Data Exchanges and Updates 
 New START Numbers, Sept 2012 
 
New START Limit       US      Russia 
Deployed SDVs (700)      806         491 
Deployed and non-deployed 
  launchers and bombers (800)   1034        884 
Deployed warheads (1550)    1722       1499 
 
Source:  U.S. Department of State 
 
 
Potential US Cost Savings 
• Robust strategic triad 
• Need to recapitalize 
• Ballistic missile 
submarines 
• Heavy bombers 
• ICBMs 
• Budget demands 
 
 
Non-Proliferation Goals 
• US nuclear reductions bolster diplomacy 
to block nuclear proliferation 
• US, Russia have to act 
• Won’t solve North Korea or Iran 
• Strengthens position to mobilize pressure 
against states seeking nuclear weapons 
A Word on Deterrence 
• Nuclear deterrence 
during the Cold War 
• At several points, 
world was lucky 
• Cuban missile crisis 
• Test errors 
• US-Norwegian 
sounding rocket 
 
Towards Lower 
Numbers … and Zero? 
• President Obama’s Prague speech 
• Reduce role and number 
• Zero attractive to US? 
• But many challenges to resolve before 
could even get close to zero 
• Still, properly designed reductions can 
enhance US security 
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL 
OPPORTUNITIES IN 2013 
     
US, Russian Nuclear 
Warhead Levels 
         US        Russia 
Deployed strategic warheads *       ~1950       ~2430 
Nonstrategic warheads            ~500       ~2000 
Non-deployed (reserve)         ~2500              ? 
    strategic warheads 
Retired warheads          ~3000      ~5000 
Total warheads                    ~8000    ~10,000 
 
    
*     Estimated actual number, not New START accountable number 
       Numbers drawn from Kristensen/Norris, “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2012” and “Russian 
Nuclear Forces, 2012,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
New US-Russia Negotiation 
• Limit each side to no more than 2000-
2500 total nuclear warheads 
• Sublimit of 1000 deployed strategic warheads 
• Limit of 500 deployed missiles, bombers 
• Overall warhead limit forces trade 
• Result = ~50% reduction 
• US still could maintain robust triad 
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Missile Defense in Europe 
• “European Phased 
Adaptive Approach” 
• (1) SM-3 IA, sea-based 
• (2) SM-3 IB, Romania 
• (3) SM-3 IIA, Poland 
• (4) SM-3 IIB 
• Endorsed by NATO 
 
NATO, Russia and MD 
• Russian concern about EPAA 
• Offense-defense relationship 
• NATO seeks cooperative missile defense 
•  But Russians want “legal” guarantee 
• Cooperative missile defense system 
• Political commitment 
• Jointly manned centers 
• Transparency 
CTBT Ratification 
• Testing moratorium 
• Senate did not approve CTBT in 1999 
• What has changed since then? 
• Stockpile stewardship program 
• Improved monitoring system 
• CTBT locks in US advantage 
• Spur ratification by others 
Multilateralizing Process 
• Lay groundwork to broaden process 
• UNSC P5 discussions 
CHALLENGES TO ARMS CONTROL 
     
Russian Position 
• No enthusiasm for new negotiations now 
• Nuclear weapons = key to superpower status 
• Link to issues such as missile defense and 
conventional forces 
• Waiting to see who will be US president 
• US strategic advantages may give Russians 
motive for further reductions 
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Allies and Assurance 
• ~200 US nuclear 
bombs believed 
deployed in Europe 
• Russians will insist 
weapons be based on 
national territory 
• Acceptable in right 
circumstances? 
 
Source:  “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2012” 
 
Verification 
• Monitoring warheads in storage 
• New ground for both sides 
• Lower monitoring confidence  
Senate Republicans 
• Skeptical about nuclear arms control 
• New START ratification proved more difficult 
than expected 
• Seek commitment to US strategic force 
modernization 
• Treaty or unilateral steps? 
 
Prospects 
• President Obama has indicated desire to 
negotiate further nuclear cuts 
• Governor Romney skeptical of arms control 
• But tight defense budget, NATO considerations 
could affect his view 
• Possible incentives for Moscow to negotiate 
 
• Have opportunity in 2013 – will we use it? 
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